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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was initiated by Respondents to exercise a 
forfeiture provision in a Uniform Real Estate Contract due to 
Appellant's alleged failure to pay real property taxes for the 
years 1976, 1978, and 1979. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On November 10, 1981, the action was tried before the 
Court sitting without a jury. The Court found that the Ap-
pellant's had failed to pay the said property taxes as required 
by the terms of the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract, and 
entered a Judgment of forfeiture awarding possession of the real 
property to Respondents, a·nd ordered Respondents to pay Ap-
pellant's the sum of $1,000 for their interest in the property. 
Appellants brought a Motion for a New Trial which was denied by 
the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, Christian A. Anderson and Linda P. Anderson, 
seek a Decree reversing the Judgment of the trial court and an 
Order for entry of Judgment consistent with the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the 
Brief of Appellants and will be reiterated here only to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the points raised. On 
October 30, 1975, the Respondents sold by Uniform Real Estate 
Contract property located in Alpine, Utah to Appellants (Tr. 12). 
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The total purchase price was $20,000. $3,000 down payment was 
made and Appellants agreed to pay the $17,000 balance in instal-
lments of $147.53 over a twenty (20) year period. In addition to 
the monthly payments, Appellants agreed, pursuant to paragraph 11 
of the contract, to pay the general taxes arising after 1975. No 
installment payments were ever missed. 
Evidently, there was some problem with the parties 
receiving tax notices for the years subsequent to 1975. The 
Respondents-Sellers do not recall receiving the tax notices for 
1976 or 1978 (Tr. 26), and the Appellants-Buyers do not recall 
receiving the Notices for 1976 and 1978 (Tr. 34). The tax notice 
for 1977 was received by the Respondents (Tr. 26), and was sent 
to and paid by the Appellants (Tr. 34). When the Respondents 
received the 1979 tax notice, they elected to pay all taxes 
current and on November 14, 1979, made demand upon Appellants for 
reimbursement of the 1976, 1978, and 1979 taxes in the total sum 
of $690.93 (Tr. 27). Upon receipt of the Respondents' letter for 
reimbursement, the Appellants immediately informed Respondents 
that, upon receipt and proof of payment of the prior years taxes, 
reimbursement would be made immediately (Tr. 27-28). Not until 
March 18, 1980, did the new attorney for the Respondents com-
municate with Appellants as to the proof of prior taxes paid by 
the Respondents (Tr. 37). In his letter, the attorney for 
Respondents made demand for reimbursement within five days 
pursuant to paragraph 14 of the contract between the parties 
-2-
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(Exhibit 9). Promptly,on March 21, 1980, the attorney for 
Appellants responded and indicated that the taxes would immed-
iately be reimbursed upon receipt of the tax bill from the 
Respondents (Tr. 38) (Exhibit 10). 
Instead of responding to Appellants' request for 
verification of taxes paid, the Respondents served a Notice to 
Quit upon the Appellants on April 22, 1980, over one month after 
the March 18, 1980 five day demand for payment. The Notice to 
Quit gave the Appellants five days to vacate the premises. 
Prior to the Notice to Quit, on May 14, 1980, Appellants 
tendered a check for the unpaid taxes to the attorney for 
Respondents (Tr. 39). On May 23, 1980, counsel for Respondents 
returned the payment, stating that the amount tendered did not 
constitute the full amount demanded in the original letter of 
March 18, 1980 and was not timely (Tr. 39) (Exhibit 12). Counsel 
for Appellants then tendered the full amount requested, $788.93, 
on June 4, 1980, which was again returned by counsel for Respond-
ents (Tr. 40) (Exhibit 13). 
On June 19, 1980, two months after the Notice to Vacate, 
Respondents commenced an action for unlawful detainer. At the 
trial of the action, the Court ruled that there was a breach of 
the contract justifying a forfeiture of the Appellants' interest 
in the real property (Tr. 67). Although the Appellants had 
dutifully made the required contract payments for over six (6) 
years, and had promptly responded to the Respondents letter of 
-3-
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March 18, 1980 agreeing to reimburse for taxes paid upon proper 
proof of payment, the Court forfeited the Appellants' interest 
upon payment of $1,000 by Respondents. Consequently, Appellants 
lost their property and lost their payments. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS ELECTED THEIR REMEDY TO PAY THE 
TAXES AND SEEK REIMBURSEMENT PROVIDED IN 
PARAGRAPH FOURTEEN OF THE CONTRACT. 
Respondents argue in their brief that nothing in the 
contract between the parties requires the seller to pursue a 
money judgment against the buyer if the seller pays the property 
taxes. With this contention the Appellants disagree. 
Paragraph fourteen of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
contains the exclusive remedy provision available to the seller 
in the event of non-payment of taxes by a Buyer. That paragraph 
provides as follows: 
"14. In the event the Buyer shall default 
in the payment of any special or general taxes, 
assessments, or insurance premiums as herein 
provided, the Seller, may, at his option, pay 
said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums 
or either of them, and if Seller elects so to 
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller 
upon demand, all such sums so advanced and paid 
by him, together with interest thereon . " 
(emphasis added) 
-4-
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In this case, the Respondents elected to pay the taxes 
under paragraph fourteen,~and the Respondents are limited to 
their reimbursement rights under that provision. The Appellants 
never denied their obligation to reimburse Respondents, promptly 
contacted Respondents, and tendered payment twice before the 
Respondents commenced their unlawful detainer action. 
Paragraph sixteen of the underlying Uniform Real Estate 
Contract contains the remedy provisions applicable to the 
non-payment of the regular monthly payments, and does not apply 
once the Seller elects the remedy in paragraph fourteen to pay 
unpaid taxes and seek reimbursement. This construction is 
supported by language in paragraph 16B of the Contract, which 
provides that in the event of default by the Buyer, or upon 
failure of the Buyer to make any payment or payments when the 
same shall become due, the Seller may bring suit and recover 
Judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and 
attorney's fees. The remedy provisions in paragraph sixteen were 
not intended by the parties to apply to delinquent taxes. 
Otherwise, the remedy provision in paragraph fourteen pertaining 
specifically to the non-payment of taxes would be mere surplus-
age. 
Appellants construction of the meaning of paragraphs 
fourteen and sixteen of the agreement are bolstered by a recent 
law review article cited by the Respondents on page six of their 
brief. In '' For f e it u r e Un d er Ins t a 11 men t Land con tr a c t s In U t ah" , 
-5-
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4 Utah Law Rev. 803, 805 (1981), the author states as follows 
with respect to the nonpayment of taxes as opposed to the 
nonpayment of the regular installment payments: 
"Further, should the Buyer fail to pay 
assessments, insurance or taxes on the property 
when due, the Seller may make the payments and 
charge them to the Buyer's balance. (Citing 
c 1 au s e 1 4, Uni form Re a 1 Est ate Contract ) • I f 
the Buyer defaults on the installment payments, 
the contract gives the Seller three options: he 
may abandon the contract and declare a for-
feiture; he may sue for all past due payments; 
or, he may proceed to foreclose the Buyer's 
interest as would any mortgagee. (Citing 
paragraph 16, Uniform Real Estate Contract) 
(emphasis added)". 
By paying the delinquent property taxes and then seeking 
reimbursement from Appellants, the Respondents elected their 
remedy and should have been barred from pursuing the inconsistent 
and alternative remedy of forfeiture. Although the Appellants 
tendered reimbursement in accordance with paragraph fourteen, the 
Respondents declared that the contract was also terminated under 
paragraph sixteen since the reimbursement was not made within 
five days. There is no five day deadline in paragraph fourteen. 
It was inconsistent for the Respondents, on the one 
hand, to affirm the agreement by paying the taxes and requesting 
repayment from Appellants, and to also terminate the contract by 
forfeiting the Appellants interest thereby retaining all the 
down and regular monthly payments as liquidated damages. 
-6-
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In the case of Cook v. Covey - Ballard Motor Company, 69 
Utah 161 253 P. 196, 200 (1927), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
the basis for the concept of election of remedies: 
"The doctrine of an election rests upon the 
principle that one may not take contrary 
positions, and where he has a right to choose 
one of two modes of redress, and the two are so 
inconsistent that the assertion of one involves 
a negation or repudiation of the other, the 
deliberate and settled choice of one, with 
knowledge or means of knowledge of such facts 
as would authorize a resort to each, will 
preclude him thereafter from going back and 
electing again." 
In Cook, supra, the Court also stated: 
"The true rule seems· to be (1) that there 
must be, in fact, two or more coexisting 
remedies upon which the party has the right to 
elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must 
be alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he 
must actually bring an action or by some other 
decisive act with knowledge of the facts, 
indicate his choice between these inconsistent 
remedies." 
By electing under paragraph fourteen to pay the taxes 
and seek repayment, the Respondents should not have been allowed 
to go back and elect paragraph sixteen as the applicable remedy. 
At a minimum, the remedy provided in paragraph fourteen 
is one of two co-existing remedies upon which the Seller has the 
right to elect, and the elected remedy of payment and reimburse-
ment is alternative to and inconsistent with the remedy of 
forfeiture. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE 
FORFEITURE REMEDY UNCONSCIONABLE AND UNENFORC-
EABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE 
Respondents argue in their brief that the Judgment 
entered by the trial court was not unreasonable, unconscionable, 
nor in the nature of a penalty. However, the parties testified 
at trial that Appellants had not failed to make any of the 
required installment payments. They had paid $3,000 down payment 
for the property and had made over $2,000 worth of improvements. 
The contract had been in force for a six year period and Appel-
lants had made total payments of over $13,000. 
For the trial Court to order the forfeiture of all but 
$1,000 worth of payments and improvements, as well as forfeiture 
of the property, all because Appellants had not tendered the 
$690.83 as reimbursement for taxes within the stated five day 
period, was clearly unconscionable and so harsh as to shock the 
conscience. 
In Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1977), this 
Court stated that the law in Utah with respect to such forfeiture 
provisions appears well settled. Quoting from Kay v. Wood, 549 
P.2d 709 (Utah, 1976), the Court in Johnson, supra, expressed 
the following regarding forfeiture provisions in real estate con-
tracts: 
"This Court has long been committed to the 
rule that parties to a contract may agree as to 
the amount of liquidated damages that shall be 
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paid in the case of a breach, that the agree-
ment is enforceable if the amount stipulated to 
is not disproportionate to the damages actually 
sustained. The provision in a contract for the 
sale of real property that all payments which 
have been made may be forfeited as liquidated 
damages will not be enforced if the forfeiture 
will be grossly excessive and disproportionate 
t o a n y p o s s i b 1 e 1 o s s s o · a s t o s h o c· k t h e 
conscience. (Citations omitted)" 
In citing from the Restatement of Contracts, Section 
339, also cited with approval in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 
468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), the Court in Johnson v. Carman, supra, 
went on to adopt the following rule with respect to liquidated 
damages: 
"(1) An agreement made in advance of breach 
fixing the damages therefore, is not enforce-
able as a contract and does not affect the 
damages recoverable for the breach unless: (a) 
the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of 
just compensation for the harm that is caused 
by the breach; and (b) the harm that is caused 
by the breach is one that is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation. (Emphasis 
added)" 
In this case, the damages constituting the breach are very 
capable of accurate estimation, because they are for the non-
payment of taxes which can be calculated exactly. 
The primary reason for the requirement that damages be 
difficult to estimate, is that when they are ascertainable, the 
exact damages determined at the time of breach will nearly always 
be more fair than those guessed at by the parties at the time of 
contracting. Johnson v. Carman, supra at p. 373-373. In this 
-9-
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action, the amount of the unpaid taxes is capable of accurate 
estimation and reimbursement by Appellants will make the Respond-
ents whole and provide both parties with the benefit of their 
bargain. To allow Respondents to retain payments and improve-
ments worth over $15,000 because of a delay in the reimbursement 
of $690, is disproportionate and shocking to the conscience 
within the meaning of prior cases decided by this Court. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING THAT FORFEITURE WAS AN AVAILABLE 
REMEDY TO RESPONDENTS, RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR 
RIGHT TO DECLARE A FORFEITURE AND COMMENCE AN 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BY REASON OF THEIR 
PAST INCONSISTENT CONDUCT 
The Respondents argue in their brief that they did not 
waive their right to claim a forfeiture, and that the Appellants' 
conduct justified the strict application of the forfeiture 
provision to the Appellants' interest in the property. However, 
testimony at trial indicated that the Respondents themselves did 
not strictly comply with the terms of the contract and they 
thereby waived their right to exact strict compliance from the 
Appellants. 
The Respondents testified that when they received the 
1977 tax notice, they delivered the notice to the Appellants' 
brother, and that the taxes for that year were paid by Appellants 
(Tr. 35). Respondents made no further inquiry on the status of 
the payment of taxes until 1979, at which time Respondents 
received the 1979 tax notice indicating that taxes for 1976 and 
-10-
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1978 were also owing (Tr. 22-23). Instead of sending the 1979 
notice to Appellants or Appellants~brother for payment, this time 
the Respondents paid the taxes and demanded reimbursement. The 
Appellants also testified that they relied on the Respondents to 
forward tax notices for payment (Tr. 34-35). 
Although the taxes had not been paid as far back as 
1976, the Respondents waited until late 1979 and early 1980 to 
strictly hold Appellants to the terms of the contract. Further-
more, once the Respondents' attorney sent a five day demand for 
payment on March 18, 1980, the counsel for Appellants immediately 
responded acknowledging the obligation of the Appellants. Instead 
of immediately responding to the letter from Appellants' counsel, 
the attorney for Respondents failed to reply at all until a 
Not ice to Quit the premises was served upon Appellants a month 
later on April 2 2' 1980. 
Upon learning of the Notice to Quit, counsel for 
Appellants tendered the amount of the unpaid taxes to the 
attorney for Respondents, who returned the payment on May 23, 
198 O for the reason that it did not constitute the amount 
demanded in the letter of March 18, 1980, nor was it paid within 
five days. Counsel for Appellants then tendered the full amount 
requested on March 18, 1980, which was also returned on June 12, 
198 0. The unlawful detainer action was then commenced on or 
b t J 19 1980, Over t hree months from the date of the a ou une , 
original five day demand. 
-11-
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The Respondents, by their prior conduct, should be 
estopped from strictly enforcing the five day demand period 
against Appellants. Waiver or estoppel is a doctrine of equity 
proposed to rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, been 
deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of 
another. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah, 
1976). In the instant case, the Appellants quickly contacted 
Respondents in response to the five day demand for payment sent 
March 18, 1980. No legal action was taken for over three months 
after the five day notice was sent. By not quickly informing 
Appellants or their attorney upon receipt of the March 21, 1980 
request for proof of payment, that the five day period would be 
strictly enforced, and by failing to take legal action for over 
three months, Respondents waived their right to refuse later 
payment on the grounds that it was not strictly tendered within 
the original five day demand period. 
POINT IV 
ASSUMING FORFEITURE WAS A REMEDY AVAILABLE TO 
RESPONDENTS, THE FIVE DAY PERIOD GIVEN TO 
APPELLANTS TO. CURE THEIR DEFAULT ON MARCH 18, 
1980 WAS UNREASONABLE AND ARBITRARY. 
The record in this case reflects that the Appellants are 
residents of the State of New Mexico, and did not personally 
reside in the residence being purchased from Respondents. The 
-12-
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five. day demand letter sent in accordance with pa~agraph 16A of 
the contract, and dated March 18, 1980, was addressed to the 
Appellants in Sante Fe, New Mexico. The letter provided that 
unless reimbursement was made to Respondents within five days 
after receipt of written notice, the Respondents would be 
released from all obligations in law and equity to convey said 
property. 
In Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 P.2d 417, 421 
(Utah, 1973), the Supreme Court of Utah stated as follows with 
respect to the usual five day notice period provided in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract: 
"We agree that in the situation of the 
usual Real Estate Contract, and perhaps even in 
this one, the five day notice to perform might 
be unreasonable and arbitrary if a more 
reasonable and longer time would have been of 
any benefit to the Buyer." 
In this action, more time certainly would have been of 
benefit to the Appellants, since they contacted an attorney in 
American Fork, Utah to respond to the demand letter of March 18, 
198 0. The Appellants attorney immediately contacted counsel for 
Respondents and acknowledged that upon receipt of the tax 
notices, reimbursement would be paid without difficulty. Conse-
quently, negotiations were underway to resolve the dispute, but 
-13-
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to limit negotiations and final settlement to five days was 
unreasonable and arbitrary and should not have been enforced by 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
An interpretation of the contract in this action leads 
to the conclusion that the Respondents elected their remedy under 
paragraph fourteen of the agreement when they paid the prior 
years taxes and sought reimbursement from the Appellants. The 
Appellants did not dispute the obligation to pay the taxes, and 
acted reasonably in response to the Respondents requests for 
payment. The damages to the Respondents were clear and ascer-
tainable and a tender of payment was made within a reasonable 
period of time. It would be harsh and inequitable for this Court 
to rule that the Appellants were strictly bound by the provisions 
and time periods set forth in the forfeiture provision of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract due to the Respondents' own lack of 
compliance and due to the grossly excessive and disproportionate 
loss suffered by the Appellants as a result of the trial Court's 
strict application and enforcement of the forfeiture provision. 
For these reasons, Appellants respectfully request this Court to 
reverse the decision below. 
-14-
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DATED this rJf 7 ~day of December, 1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
,BRAD-R •. BALDWIN 
/Attorneys for Appellants 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to: Heber Grant 
Ivins, Attorney for Respondents, 75 North Center, American Fork, 
.,.;1 
84003, postage prepaid on the 7 --Elay of December, 1982. Utah 
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